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Abstract  
This paper discusses asymptotic and bootstrap inference methods for a set of 
inequality and progressivity indices. The application of non-degenerate U-statistics 
theory is described, particularly through the derivation of the Suits-progressivity index 
distribution. We have also provided formulae for the “plug-in” estimator of the index 
variances, which are less onerous than the U-statistic version (this is especially relevant 
for those indices whose asymptotic variances contain kernels of degree 3). As far as 
inference issues are concerned, there are arguments in favour of applying bootstrap 
methods. By using an accurate database on income and taxes of the Spanish 
households (statistical matching EPF90-IRPF90), our results show that bootstrap 
methods perform better (considering their sample precision), particularly those 
methods yielding asymmetric CI. We also show that the bootstrap method is a useful 
technique for Lorenz dominance analysis. An illustration of such application has been 
made for the Spanish tax and welfare system. We distinguish clear dominance of cash-
benefits on income redistribution. Public health and state school education also have 
significant redistributive effects. 
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Numerous empirical studies in applied welfare economic analysis are based on a 
microeconomic framework where the input information consists in a sample of individuals or 
households. This information generally comes from household surveys or administrative 
records – or, in some cases, from a statistical fusion of both types of datasets. The range of 
these studies is quite wide, covering from income inequality and redistribution to tax and 
transfer incidence analysis or microsimulation of public policies.  
An important output from such analysis is the estimation of statistics, namely, vertical and 
horizontal inequality indices, Lorenz curves, redistributive effects and progressivity measures 
of a tax or a set of taxes. These indices are of primary interest, not only for academic purposes 
related to this field but also for policy makers to acquire knowledge of the welfare policies 
therein embedded.  
As well as the estimation of these indices, statistical inference is another quantitative aspect 
which  needs  to  be  considered.  Although theoretical properties of global inequality and tax 
progressivity indices have been studied by many authors, statistical inference analysis has not 
been completely adopted in applied research. In the case of Gini-related inequality indices, we 
can find results in Fraser (1957), Gastwirth (1974), Cowell (1989). Results for the generalized 
entropy class of inequality measures are provided in Cowell (1989) and Thistle (1990). 
Bishop et al. (1998) derived the sampling distribution of Kakwani and Reynolds-Smolensky 
indices. These are only a few examples taken from the huge amount of important research in 
this field. The first part of this paper is related to this area. The U-statistics theory can be used 
as a unifying framework to derive the large-sample distribution of inequality and 
progressivity indices, particularly those which admit representation in terms of non- 
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degenerate U-statistics. This property can be used to estimate the indices of interest and their 
corresponding sampling variances.  
Once the analytical expressions of the index variances are obtained, there are two alternative 
ways to estimate the elements of the variance formulae, namely estimators based on U-
statistics and those known as ‘plug-in’ estimators. The calculation via U-statistics mainly 
involves dealing with expressions of computational cost 
3 () n Ο . Estimators based on the 
principle of substitution or ‘plug in’ estimators are of lower order, reducing the computational 
burden of the variance expressions.  The ‘plug-in’ estimators of sampling variances have been 
obtained in the paper for all the indices. We wish to highlight the derivation of the sampling 
variance of horizontal-inequality Atkinson-Plotnick index and particularly of the Suits 
progressivity-index, which has a very complicated variance formula.   
The next step is to set confidence intervals or hypothesis testing. Both the classical hypothesis 
testing based on the asymptotic approach and the bootstrap procedure can be used for 
inference. Focusing on bootstrap confidence intervals (CI), for example, we have an easy way 
to evaluate the index values regarding their sampling variability -see Mills and Zandvakili 
(1997) who compared bootstrap intervals of Gini and Theil indices with those obtained from 
the normal approximation. Another more recent study is from Biewen (2002) who extended 
the analysis to poverty and mobility measures and who also carried out a simulation study to 
analyse the finite sample behaviour of the two approaches.  
We have complemented these two studies by applying the bootstrap procedure to the 
inequality and progressivity indices as well as to the Lorenz curve ordinates corresponding to 
income deciles. The estimation and inference on Lorenz curves deserves special attention. 
Beach and Davidson (1983) derived the sampling distribution of Lorenz ordinates and 
proposed dominance tests. Davidson and Duclos (1997) and Duclos (1997) extended these  
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results for correlated samples and formalized estimation and inference on these indices by 
deducing the asymptotic distribution of a set of quantiles in the Lorenz curves.  
Bootstrapping indices or Lorenz curves present an important advantage with respect to the 
asymptotic formulae: bootstrapping incorporates the correlation structures existing in the 
microdata, such as dependency which occurs between pre-tax and post-tax income in a cross-
sectional study or between variables coming from consecutive panel-data waves. The 
asymptotic approach can also deal with these data dependencies but with a complex process 
of deriving the covariance structures. 
We have performed two empirical exercises.  
First, we compare the sampling performance of bootstrap inference results with those 
obtained from the normal approximation through a simulation analysis. This experiment uses 
a microdata set coming from the statistical matching EPF90-IRPF90 as the parent population. 
The simulation is carried out considering different sample sizes and for a set of selected 
indices. The performance of different bootstrap methods for the construction of confidence 
intervals together with the standard asymptotic interval is evaluated in terms of their coverage 
probability. Results reveal that bootstrap methods work better even for large samples, 
particularly those bootstrap methods yielding asymmetric CI. 
Second, we describe the progressivity and redistributive profile of the Spanish tax-benefit 
system as a whole by using data from EPF90-IRPF90. This empirical exercise is based on the 
estimation and bootstrapping of Lorenz and concentration curves. Within a multiple 
hypothesis-testing framework, dominance analysis has been made between different taxes and 
benefits to analyze their individual effect on income redistribution. These tests enable us to 
establish a statistical ordering of the components of the tax and benefit systems in terms of 
their progressivity and redistributive effects.  
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 1 is this introduction. Section 2 offers a general 
description of the approaches mentioned therein. First, the estimates of the respective indices 
based on U-statistics are presented along with the “plug-in” variance estimations. In addition, 
the detailed process of deriving the asymptotic distribution of a particular index is explained 
through the demonstration of the Suits progressivity-index (see Appendix A). Second, we 
describe bootstrap methods for the setting up of inference procedures and we also present 
multiple tests to be used in later sections. Section 3 provides results of the Monte Carlo 
exercise performed for the comparison of the asymptotic and bootstrap confidence intervals. 
In Section 4, bootstrap multiple tests are applied in order to test welfare dominance of taxes 
and benefits in Spain. A clear ordering of the different components of the Spanish tax and 
welfare systems has been established. Section 5 provides brief concluding remarks.  
 
 
2. INEQUALITY AND PROGRESSIVITY INDICES: U-STATISTICS AND 
BOOTSTRAP METHODS 
As mentioned in the introduction, U-statistics theory gives us a general setting for deducing 
the index asymptotic distributions and especially for assessing the asymptotic variance 
formulas to be applied in confidence intervals or hypothesis testing (non-parametric setting). 
A simple illustration is given by the well known Gini index, which can be expressed in terms 
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represents the pre-tax income variable with distribution function F(x) and  x µ  is the 
population mean of x. In an earlier application, Hoeffding showed that the usual estimator of 
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which is known as the Gini mean difference statistic is itself a U-statistic, specifically the U-
statistic related to the kernel  12 1 2 (, ) hx x x x =−. Furthermore, any inequality or 
progressivity measure expressed in terms of functionals is consistently estimated by their 
corresponding U-statistics.  
Let X represent the pre-tax income variable and Y denote a general variable that in some cases 
will represent tax or benefit (T), and in others, the post-tax income, defined as Y=X-T 
(benefits can be treated as a negative tax and then should be added to X to get final income). 
Consider that X and Y are jointly distributed under H(x,y) with F(x) and G(y) the respective 
marginal functions of X and Y. Table I summarizes the index expressions in terms of 
statistical functionals.  
{ insert Table I} 
In addition, the U-statistics that estimate the respective functionals are shown in the last 
section of table I. Replacing every functional by its corresponding U-statistic in the index 
expression and by the application of Slutsky’s Theorem, we obtain consistent estimators of 
the indices. The following step- which is the central point- is to derive the asymptotic 
variances of the indices estimators.  
Some indices are U-statistic of degree 1, such as Theil and Atkinson inequality measures. In 
fact, they are functions of a sum of identical and independent random variables. Thus, they 
could be dealt with by simply applying the Central Limit Theorem (CLT), which is a 
particular case of Hoeffding’s theorem. The other indices are either functionals of degree 2 or 
emerge as combinations of functionals of degree 2. In these cases, the application of 
Hoeffding’s theorem 7.1 on the asymptotic multivariate normality of a vector of U-statistics  
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together with the Delta method leads to the index asymptotic variances. Consistent estimates 
of the variances can be obtained from estimators based on U-statistics.  
However, despite their very interesting properties (see Lee (1990) for example), the 











 terms. If the sample size n is large –which is the case for common 
household surveys- this computation can be costly.  Let us show, as an example, equation 
A11 in appendix A: the U-statistic which estimate the element (4,3) of the covariance matrix 
of the Suits index is O(n
3) 
1, whereas its plug-in estimator -see equation A16 in Appendix A- 
is O(n
2). The plug-in method also leads to consistent estimators (assuming continuity of the 
functionals) and they are easier to program. Finally, the plug-in estimators corresponding to 
the asymptotic variances of the indices presented in table I are described in Table II.  
{insert Table II} 
After the respective standard errors are calculated, confidence intervals and hypothesis tests 
can be carried out to verify changes in income inequality or tax progressivity, issues that 
policy makers are frequently interested in. An example of asymptotic tests for assessing 
changes in income inequality and tax- progressivity in the context of tax reform is given by 
Bishop et al. (1998). This kind of test applies not only for independent samples, but also to 
correlated data: for example, comparing two indices from a single sample or from completely 
dependent samples (two waves from a balanced panel).  
An alternative method to estimate the sampling distribution and perform hypothesis tests 
based on these sampling results is given by bootstrap techniques. Basically, bootstrap is a 
resampling method for simulating the empirical distribution of an estimator, in our case, an 
                                                 
1 The estimators corresponding to the functionals which are multiplied by 4 in matrix A5 are O(n
3).   
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inequality or progressivity index or the Lorenz curve ordinates, which we denote by I.  This 
procedure mainly consists in the extraction of R independent samples of size n drawn with 
replacement from the original sample data (bootstrap resample). The statistic is computed for 
each resample yielding 
* ˆ I , the so-called bootstrap replication of the statistic  ˆ I . An 
estimation of the sampling variability of  ˆ I  is obtained by applying the expression of the 
standard deviation to the R-length vector of bootstrap replications. Let us now focus on 
estimating confidence intervals. We consider three procedures. First is the percentile method 
to estimate confidence intervals. This procedure is described as follows: from R bootstrap 
samples, an estimation of the empirical function  ˆ
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For a significance level of α , the percentile method consists in computing the (α /2) and (1-
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computing the confidence interval as follows 
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  (3) 
Second is an improved version of the percentile method is BCa, “bias-corrected and 
accelerated”, based on a correction of the formulas corresponding to the empirical percentiles 
(see Efron and Tibshirani (1993), chapter 14). Third comes the bootstrap approach for the 
construction of confidence intervals which is bootstrap-t, based on the same logic that 
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* ˆ ()  and  r es
* ˆ ()  are the bootstrap replications of the statistic of interest and its standard 
error, respectively. Subsequently, a number of R replications of  r t
*()  are generated in order to 
replicate the “bootstrap-t table”, by using the percentile method previously explained. Finally, 
the α -percentile is 
() ˆ t









≤= ∑ . Hence, the bootstrap-t interval is 
defined as: 
(1 ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ , It s e It s e
αα − −⋅− ⋅     (5) 
Both BCa and bootstrap-t are second-order accurate, i.e. the corresponding approximated 
coverage converges to the nominal coverage at a rate of 1/n, as compared to other bootstrap 
methods, the standard and percentile among them, which are first-order accurate (rate of 
n / 1 ). An important drawback of the bootstrap-t concerns the estimation of the denominator 
in equation (4). When the analytic expression of the standard error of the index is unknown, it 
is necessary to compute its bootstrap estimate, which means two nested levels of resampling, 
which incurs resampling every resample. This notably increases the computational cost of the 
process as well as adding a new approximation error. 
From the idea that underlies bootstrap methods and the relationship between confidence 
intervals and hypothesis tests, inference is easy to carry out by computing an empirical 
approximation to the p-value of a test. We will consider the application of this procedure 
under two different scenarios that are quite common in income and tax related studies. The 
first scenario concerns the situation in which two separate samples are drawn from 
independent distributions: ) ,..., , ( 2 1 n X X X,   12 ( , ,..., ) m YY Y . This would cover the case of 
inequality or progressivity comparisons between different years or countries by using 
independent samples. The second scenario refers to having correlated data. The observed data  
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in this case,  () () () {} n n Y X Y X Y X , ,..., , , , 2 2 1 1 , is assumed to come from a joint distribution and 
each observation of the sample consists of a vector of two components, for instance pre-tax 
income and post-tax income measured over the same individuals/households in a particular 
year or two consecutive observations extracted from panel waves. 
Now, suppose we are interested in testing the null  01 2 : H II =  against  11 2 : H II > 11 2 (: ) H II < , 
which is redefined as  0 :0 HD =  against  1 :0 HD > ( 1 :0 HD < ). The testing procedure based 
on bootstrap involves to first computing the difference statistic  12 ˆˆˆ D II =− . Then, in a second 
step and under the first scenario, the resampling is performed separately on each sample, 
while under the second scenario, the joint sample is resampled as a whole, where each pair of 
observations that belong to a same individual/household is treated as a block or unit. Finally, 
the p-value of the test is computed from the bootstrap distribution of the statistic  ˆ D that is 
obtained after a fixed number R of iterations. 
The testing procedure is somewhat more complicated in the case of testing Lorenz dominance 
between two distributions, since the test statistic is no longer a single value but a vector of 
curve ordinates. This means we are in a multiple testing context. In this case, the bootstrap 
procedure is applied for computing the individual p-values corresponding to each individual 
hypothesis. The test statistic is defined as  ˆ( ), 1,...,
i Dp i k = , that is, the estimated difference 
between the two curves evaluated in a set of ordinates, which are commonly established to be 
the deciles, that is, k=9 and, 
1 0.1 p = ,…,
9 0.9 p = .  
At this stage we distinguish two types of multiple hypothesis testing. The first, and also the 
largest group, comprises those tests that aim to assess dominance between curves. For 
example, the assessment of Lorenz dominance can be used to test the progressivity and 
redistributive effect of a tax or benefit through income scale. The tests are set up in a way that  
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rejection of the null hypothesis implies dominance between the selected curves. In other 
words, the research hypothesis here is the alternative hypothesis since the researcher designs 
the test expecting the data to give evidence in favour of H1. The null hypothesis tests are 
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< ∩ . The decision rule consists in 
rejecting 0 j H p valuej α
∧
⇔< −   9 ,..., 1 = ∀ j
3. For this group of tests, the Intersection-Union 
Tests (IUT) Theory (see Casella and Berger (1990) theorem 8.3.23) offers an upper limit for 
the global type I error (α* ), which is set as the highest of the individual significance levels, 
i.e.  j M j α α ) ,.., 1 (
* sup ∈ = , where 
j α  is the significance level corresponding to the j-th 
individual hypothesis, j=1,…,k. For example, by setting the individual level at 0.05, the global 
type I error is bound to be lesser or equal to 0.05. 
Now, assume we are interested in testing proportionality of a tax or benefit. We consider that 
a tax/benefit is proportional when the difference between the Lorenz income curve and the 
concentration tax curve equals zero for all the ordinates in the curve. Note that according to 
the way in which the null hypothesis in the tests already discussed (tests type I) is set up, its 
acceptance does not imply proportionality but ‘non-dominance’. Therefore, the assessment of 
proportionality claims for a different type of test. This second type of testing procedure is 
based on the Union-Intersection Test (UIT) Theory, which uses the Bonferroni inequality as a 
solution to the problem of multiplicity. The null hypothesis for this second type of test is 
                                                 
3 In the particular case of comparing the Lorenz curves of two distributions A and B, the non rejection of the H0 
will indicate that the differences between both curves are not statistically significant, but this statement neither 
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≠ ∪ . The decision 
rule is set as follows
4: the null hypothesis is rejected if and only if  {} /9 min j j p value α
∧
−<. 
Observe that to the contrary of the previous tests, the research hypothesis is now the null 
hypothesis.  
Finally, the relationship between bootstrapping and U-statistics is of interest. Helmers (1991), 
Arcones and Giné (1992), prove that the bootstrap approximation to the finite distribution of 
U-statistics implies an improvement of size of 
1/2 n
−  with respect to the asymptotic approach.  
 
 
3. COMPARING ASYMPTOTIC AND BOOTSTRAP CONFIDENCE INTERVALS:  
EVIDENCE FROM A SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
This section aims to study the finite sampling behaviour of inequality and progressivity 
indices through the asymptotic and bootstrap approaches. In  particular, we compare the 
performance of bootstrap methods with those obtained from the normal approximation 
through a simulation study. The proposed confidence intervals in section 2 are then estimated 
on these samples.  
In our analysis, a large sample of approximately 21,500 observations (the Spanish EPF90-
IRPF90 statistical matching, Calonge and Manresa (2001), is regarded as the parent 
                                                 
4 The acceptance of H0 implies that both curves or distributions are proportional. However, note that the rejection 
of H0 is not conclusive about the statistically significant difference between the two curves, namely the ‘Lorenz 





population from which, small samples of different fixed sizes are randomly drawn
5. An 
important feature in this experiment is the fact that it uses real data on household income and 
taxes, in contrast to other studies, such a the one of Biewen (2002), where data is simulated 
from a parametric distribution. We have the opportunity to evaluate the behaviour of the 
proposed inference techniques regarding common problems, such as the presence of outliers 
in income and tax variables and censoring for the income-tax variable. These data 
characteristics, which may have an important effect on the estimated indices are, however, 
more difficult to reproduce in a classical simulation study where data is drawn from a pre-
fixed parametric distribution. Furthermore, the whole complexity of large household 
databases can barely be replicated in a simulated environment. 
This exercise is carried out for a proposed set of income inequality indices - Gini, Theil, 
deciles of income Lorenz curve - and Kakwani and Suits tax progressivity indices. Table III 
shows the population parameters of the mentioned indices computed on the reference 
population.  
{Insert Table III} 
We consider four types of confidence intervals. The first one is the classical standard interval 
based on the normal approximation. The second type of interval, named modified standard, is 
obtained from the first one by replacing the asymptotic standard error by its bootstrap 
estimation. The third and fourth are respectively the BCa and bootstrap-t intervals already 
mentioned. To evaluate the sampling accuracy of the proposed methods we focus on the 
estimated coverage level computed over each type of confidence interval. The coverage level 
                                                 
5 Briefly, this database links two sources of information: EPF90 Household Spanish Survey and a representative 
sample of 1990 income-tax payers. The database contains then  information on income, direct and indirect taxes 
and socio-economic characteristics of the members of the household. Household pre-tax income and tax/benefit 
payments have been equivalised by using the following scale: s=(A+0,5*C)
0,5 , where A and C represent the 




is defined as the percentage of times an interval includes the real parameter. The simulation 
runs 2000 replications of the following algorithm for three different sample sizes n (=200, 
1000, 2000).  
Repeat for i=1,…,S(=2000)  the following steps: First,  draw a random sample without 
replacement of size n from the simulation universe and compute the statistic of interest. 
Second, compute the standard interval for each index. Third, generate R=1000 bootstrap 
resamples (extractions with replacement the same size n as the original sample) from the 
sample obtained in the first step. In this procedure, the bootstrap distribution of the index is 
obtained and used for computing the bootstrap confidence intervals: modified standard, BCa 
and bootstrap-t. For each interval, accumulate the coverage indicator value (Ic=1 if the 
interval includes the parameter, 0 otherwise), compute the shape and length measurements. 
Finally, the approximate real coverage and the average values for shape, length and interval 
extremes are computed as the final results of the simulation.  
{ insert tables IV and V} 
Tables IV and V show the approximate coverage levels obtained from the Monte Carlo 
simulation already described. Results regarding shape, length and interval extremes are found 
in Appendix B (Tables B.I and B.II) In general traits, if we focus on coverage accuracy, 
results suggest that bootstrap confidence intervals are superior to those computed from the 
normal distribution. Particularly, the improved percentile method BCa and bootstrap-t achieve 
higher coverage accuracy compared to the modified standard. For the Gini index and the 
Lorenz curve deciles, the discrepancies between real and nominal coverage probabilities 
range from half to two percentage points when considering large samples (n=2000). Both 
methods BCa and bootstrap-t yield approximate coverage probabilities close to the nominal  
 
14
value of 0.95. However, some of the simulated-p are out of the acceptance interval 
{ } ˆ 0.94,0.96 p ∈  corresponding to the test  0 ˆ :0 . 9 5 Hp =  for S=2000.  
Regarding the Theil index, results suggest a poorer performance for all the methods, denoted 
by coverage levels that are substantially distant from the nominal one. In any case, the 
coverage figures for bootstrap intervals still remain higher (for instance, in the case of 
n=2000 the standard method estimated coverage is 0.718 whereas the bootstrap-t presents a 
coverage value of 0.867, more than 14 percentage points higher).  
On the other hand, Kakwani and Suits indices show a very similar behavioural pattern, that is, 
bootstrap intervals are more efficient in terms of coverage accuracy. BCa and bootstrap-t 
intervals show the highest ‘real’ coverage probabilities, with discrepancies between them not 
higher than two percentage points. Results regarding the progressivity indices show higher 
coverage when the index is evaluated on indirect taxes as opposed to direct taxes. Coverage 
levels for direct tax indices show a poor performance and do not present a clear increasing 
pattern with the sample size. This could be partially due to the higher presence of extreme 
values or zero observations in the distribution corresponding to direct taxation, though further 
evidence is needed for a firm conclusion. 
Worthy of note are the differences between the intervals based on the normal approximation, 
namely the standard and the modified standard. Global results show a slightly better 
performance of the latter. More exactly, differences between the nominal and ‘real’ coverage 
probabilities reach values up to 23 and 18 percentage points in favour of the modified 
standard. These percentages correspond to the Theil index for n=2000. This indicates that 
even the simple alteration that the modified standard interval incorporates with respect to the 
standard one still implies an improvement.  
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Finally, based on these results, we can conclude that bootstrap intervals are more accurate 
than the ones based on the normal approximation, yielding wider and asymmetric intervals 
that can better capture the characteristics of the index finite sampling distribution
6. An 
important point to highlight is that BCa and bootstrap-t performances are very much alike, 




4. INFERENCE ON REDISTRIBUTION AND PROGRESSIVITY OF TAXES AND 
BENEFITS: AN APPLICATION TO THE SPANISH CASE. 
In this section we estimate the redistributive effect and progressivity of taxes and benefits in 
Spain. We illustrate this using micro-data from the 1990 statistical matching EPF-IRPF. To 
evaluate the effects of taxes and benefits on income distribution we need first to identify who 
bears the tax burden and who receives the public benefits (economic incidence). The 
allocation of taxes and benefits to the households has been made according to the one 
proposed by Calonge and Manresa (1997) who followed the annual approach pioneered by 
Pechman and Okner (1974)
7.  
On the tax-side, the burden has been imputed for each household according to different 
assumptions. The income tax, employee and self-employed social security contributions have 
been allocated to the households whose members pay these particular taxes. One of the most 
crucial shifting assumptions is that related to the social security contributions paid by employers 
                                                 
6 Tables in Appendix B show the shape and length of the intervals. Bootstrap-t method shows more degrees of 
positive/negative asymmetry due to larger upper/lower limit estimations.  
7In some sense, incidence shifting-assumptions are due to the degree of uncertainty about how the tax-shifting 
operates. However, the assumed hypotheses are based mainly on evidence found in the Spanish literature. See 
Argimón and González Páramo (1987) for a discussion of the incidence of social security contributions in Spain. See 




and the corporation income tax. We assume that two-thirds of this social security contribution is 
shifted to employees and one-third to consumption (by increasing the goods and services price). 
Regarding corporation income tax we explore two different incidence hypotheses. In the first 
one, one-third of the tax is allocated in proportion to capital income, one-third to the property 
income in general and one-third is shifted to consumption. In the second hypothesis, which is 
more progressive, two-thirds are allocated in proportion to the capital owners and one-third to 
consumption. Taxation on consumption (value added tax, excise taxes, car tax, and property tax 
on houses) has been computed for every household in the sample considering the expenditure its 
members declared on levied commodities and services. Import taxes are allocated proportionally 
to the expenditure made by each household with respect to the total expenditure.  
On the benefit-side, pension and unemployment benefits have been obviously allocated to the 
members of the households who received such benefits. The per-capita cost of benefits-in-kind 
provided by the public sector (education and health services) has been assigned to the members 
of the household who are considered recipients of those benefits . The overall taxes allocated to 
households represent 92% of the global revenue for the fiscal year 1990, which is a highly 
significant value of the total burden.  
A standard approach to measuring the effect of a tax on the income distribution is to calculate 
the difference between the pre-tax and post-tax concentration indices. Denote by X the pre-tax 
income of a particular household, T the tax liability and Y=X-T the post-tax income variable. The 
redistributive effect of a tax on income distribution RE is defined by the expression: 
XY
t
RE=G C = K
1-t
−   (6) 
 
where CY is the post-tax concentration index, GX is the Gini coefficient of pre-tax income, K is 
the Kakwani progressivity-index and t is the tax average rate on X. It is evident from this formula  
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that redistribution depends on two quantities: the liability progression measured by the Kakwani 
index and the average tax rate t. Thus, we can test if the RE of a particular tax/benefit is 





 tends to a standard normal distribution , where the variance can  be computed 
according to formula 4 in Table II .  
Instead of focusing on merely ‘single’ indices, we have considered the analysis throughout the 
income distribution by using the Lorenz dominance criterion.  We estimate the Lorenz and 
concentration curves underlying these indices and we perform tests of dominance between 
curves. We get a more detailed description of the redistributive patterns of tax and benefits by 
evaluating the following expression below (7), which is the counterpart of the one defined in (6) 
for a set of p-ordinates of the Lorenz curve, for example, the income deciles:  
XX RE(p)=C (p) - L (p) 0<p<1  (7) 
where CX (p) is the post-tax income concentration curve, LX (p) is the pre-tax income Lorenz 
curve and p are the pre-tax income deciles. The RE(p) distances and pre-tax income deciles are 
represented on the y and x axes respectively. Each estimated ordinate is represented together with 
its corresponding confidence interval obtained from the application of the BCa method to a 
sample of size n=2000, randomly extracted from the sample. The number of bootstrap replicates 
has been set to R=1000. We should notice first that the multiple test with null hypothesis H0: 
RE(p)=0 examines the dominance of the post-tax income concentration curve on the pre-tax 
income Lorenz curve. In other words; rejecting the null implies dominance of one curve over 
the other. Then, we test the existence of a “pro-poor” redistributive effect if RE(p) > 0 (which 
is the case when the post-tax income concentration curve lies above the pre-tax income 
Lorenz curve) and it is statistically significant. According to the way this particular multiple  
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test is defined, this is equivalent to the case when the RE confidence intervals computed on p-
ordinates do not cross the x-axis. On the contrary, a negative value for RE(p) indicates that we 
are testing a “pro-rich” redistributive effect: in this case, the post-tax concentration curve lies 
below the pre-tax income Lorenz curve. In both cases, the global redistribution achieved is 
measured by the area between the D(p)-curve and the abscissa-axis p,  which, when doubled, 
coincides with the Reynolds-Smolensky-index.  
Figure 1 shows the RE(p) curves evaluated on income deciles for the following variables: 
personal income tax (PIT), the corporate tax under the most progressive incidence assumption 
(CT(2)), direct taxes (DT) (which include PIT, CT(2) and the total amount of social security 
contributions allocated to employees), indirect taxes (IT) and benefits (BE).  
{Insert figure 1} 
At first view, figure 1 suggests that personal income tax, corporate tax, direct taxes and total 
benefits have a positive and statistically significant redistributive effect on income 
distribution since their confidence intervals calculated at α  = 0.05 do not include the abscissa 
axis for any of the mentioned curves, except for some deciles of CT(2). Figure 1 also shows 
that the impact of indirect taxation on income distribution is also statistically significant but 
with a negative redistributive effect. In fact, when we perform the corresponding multiple 
tests of Lorenz dominance, the null H0: RE(p)=0  is rejected for all of them except for CT(2). 
In this last case, a more detailed look at the p-values of the individual tests show that the non-
rejection is due to the first estimated decile, with an individual p-value of 0.096. Another 
conclusion on the tax-side is obtained by looking at the slope of the curves. For example, the 
RE(p) for personal income tax achieves its maximum, 0.031, in the eighth decile. Hence, the 
income-tax redistributes 3,14% of the total post-tax income amount from the two top deciles 
to the rest of the distribution.  
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Another interesting issue other than the testing of whether a tax or benefit has a statistically 
significant redistributive effect is to establish a statistical ordering of the different taxes and 
benefits in terms of their redistributive capacity. This is achieved by means of the RE 
dominance test described in section 2. This test has been applied to a set of pairs of 
tax(es)/benefit(s) selected according to the ordering given in figure 1. Results are presented in 
table VII.  
{ insert table VII} 
All pairwise comparisons except for the pair DT-PIT present global p-values equal to zero, 
which means that the left-handside tax/benefit RE-dominates the right-handside one. 
Corporate tax under the most progressive assumption exhibits a similar redistributive profile 
to the income tax, although its redistributive effect is lower. 
The curve corresponding to direct taxes and the personal-income-tax curve cross, so a full test 
of dominance does not apply. However, individual p-values indicate that the direct taxes 
curve dominates the personal income tax curve up to the seventh decile. In other words, a 
multiple test of “partial” dominance on this part of the curve (deciles one to seven, both 
included) would clearly lead to the rejection of the null. So it would appear that income tax 
plays a prominent role in the highest part of the income distribution.  
The most impressive result is the considerable dominance of total benefits on direct taxes, 
which emphasizes the redistributive power that benefits play on income redistribution. This 
curve reaches its maximum in the sixth decile, indicating a redistribution of 7% of the total 
amount of final income from deciles higher than the sixth towards the rest of the population. 
A more detailed picture about benefits would be of interest. Figure 2 displays the RE(p) 
curves for different categories of benefits and Table VIII shows the global p-values 
corresponding to the RE-dominance tests performed to the pairs of benefits chosen.  
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{Insert figure 2} 
Results show first that the redistribution effect of cash benefits (CB) and benefits-in -kind 
(BiK) are both statistically significant. Figure 2 also indicates a clear dominance ordering 
between the two curves, illustrated by the non-overlapping between the ordinates’ interval 
estimates. Cash benefits have the largest redistributive effect on income distribution - all 
pairwise comparisons involving CB on the left hand-side result in p-values equal to zero, as 
shown in table VIII. The redistributive effect of BiK is also remarkable. Breaking it down into 
three categories –‘health services’ (HB), ‘primary and secondary education’ (EdI) and 
‘university education’ (EdII) – enable us to establish a dominance ordering. Health services 
have the largest RE followed by ‘primary and secondary education’.  
{Insert table VIII} 
In fact, as the positive-slope fragment of the benefit curves shows, 60% of the population with 
lower resources is benefit receiver as compared to a situation in which benefits are evenly 
distributed. Finally, public expenditure on university education has null redistributive effect: 
the test of proportionality computed on its RE curve results in a global p-value of 0.810, 
which indicates that the null hypothesis of proportionality can not be rejected (see also figure 
II).  
Once we have measured and evaluated the redistributive profile of a tax or benefit it is 
interesting to picture the contribution of each decile to the global redistribution (RE). The 
following difference  
ii - 1 RE(p )-RE(p )  (7) 
measures the “redistributive load” carried by decile i. If we take the personal income tax 
shown in figure 3 as an example, the ninth and tenth deciles account for percentages of 13.8% 
and 86,2% of RE, respectively. The redistributive effect induced by direct taxation as a whole  
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proves to be less progressive because in this case, taxpayers spread from the sixth to the tenth 
deciles. The contribution of the ninth and tenth deciles to the redistribution is of the order of 
33% and 55% respectively. Each receiver decile captures around 20-22% of the redistributive 
effect, except for the fourth that receives 15% of the overall income that is redistributed. 
{Insert figure 3} 
Figure 3 also reveals that indirect taxation causes regressive income redistribution. Note that 
the poorest deciles up to the seventh decile are punished in the sense that a larger net income 
would be expected, had the indirect tax been replaced by a proportional one. As a result of the 
regressivity of indirect taxes, the two highest deciles become “winners”. Particularly, the 
income redistributed towards the richest deciles due to indirect taxation amounts to 1,15% of 
the post-tax income, from which 87% is perceived by the top decile.  
In the same way as the redistributive profile was defined from the concept of RE(p) distance, 
we can define the progressivity profile of a tax as  
XT TR(p)=L (p) - C (p).  (9) 
where TR(p) indicates the difference between the pre-tax income Lorenz curve and the tax 
concentration curve (see figure 4). Twice the region defined between the TR(p) curve and the 
abscissas axis coincides with the Kakwani index
8. The results on TR-dominance multiple tests 
are shown in table VIII. 
{Insert figure IV} 
{ Insert table IX} 
The following features can be drawn on the tax-side .  First, the personal income tax has 
clearly the most progressive profile, as indicated by the p-values corresponding to the 
                                                 
8 This  distance is interpreted as the fraction of total tax that is transferred from households with income less than 
100p percentile towards the upper side of the distribution as a result of the system’s progressivity.  
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pairwise comparisons between this tax and each of the remaining taxes. Comparing the CT 
progressivity profiles under the two different incidence assumptions is of a special interest. 
The corporate tax variant (2) has been tested as a progressive one against CT(1) tax.  In fact, 
the shape of the CT(1) curve rather suggests a proportional or regressive profile. However, the 
test of regressivity fails to reject the null hypothesis with a global p-value of 0.413 (observe 
the overlapping for some decile intervals with the x axis). Moreover, a second test of 
proportionality is not significant (the null hypothesis of proportionality is rejected). This 
illustrates that the acceptance of the null in a test of progressivity/regressivity (assessed by 
type I tests) does not imply the proportionality of the tax or benefit (assessed by type II tests). 
Hence, neither a regressive nor a proportional nature can be inferred for CT(1). It is obvious 
that the pattern of corporate tax is pretty sensitive to the incidence assumption adopted, and 
more research is needed about shifting assumptions. 
The direct taxes and the CT(2) curves cross at the fourth decile. However, by examining the 
individual p-values, we can establish a partial dominance of DT over CT(2) for the first three 
deciles, and a partial dominance of CT(2) over DT for the part of the curve that comprises the 
fifth to the ninth deciles (both included). As for the dominance of direct taxes over corporate 
tax variant (1), the test of TR-dominance fails to reject the null hypothesis with a global p-
value of 0.241. But once again, the partial test applied to deciles up to the seventh is rejected 
with a p-value of 0.022, which means that in this part of the curve, direct taxes are statistically 
more progressive than CT(1). 
The reading from these curves is just the opposite to that of the tax curves. A benefit curve 
lying under the abscissas axis will indicate progressivity of the benefit. The most striking 
feature that arises from figure 5 is the fact that all benefit curves except for the one related to  
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university education have similar shapes. Moreover, most of these curves cross each other, 
thus impeding a TR dominance ranking among them. 
University education exhibits the lowest progressivity profile among all the benefits 
considered. The test with null TR(p)=0 fails to be rejected for this type of benefits (with a 
global p-value of 0.206), indicating a non-significant progressive effect. At the same time, the 
corresponding test of proportionality fails to be rejected, which implies the statistically 
significant proportionality of university education. All tests of progressivity performed over 
the remaining benefit curves are significant, that is, the null hypothesis TR(p)=0 is rejected for 
all of them. 
{Insert Table IX}. 
Note that for these tests, the alternative hypothesis is TR(T1 )<TR(T2 ), which means that 
benefit T1 is more progressive than benefit T2. Regarding the setting up of a ranking, an 
examination of the p-values provided in Table IX reveals that cash benefits, benefits in kind 
and health benefits TR dominate university education. The rest of the pairs do not cross 
except for CB-BiK and EdI-EdII. For the first pair, the global dominance test cannot be 
rejected, with a p-value=0.376. A closer look at the individual p-values shows an important 
overlapping for deciles above the third one. This is not the case for the second pair of curves, 
for which, although presenting a global p-value of 0.346, the overlapping only occurs at the 
first decile . 
The main findings from the progressivity and redistributive effect analyses are summarized in 
the following lines. Although direct taxes play an important role in the redistribution made by 
the Spanish tax-benefit system, total benefits appear to be the component of the system that 
exerts the largest redistributive effect. A closer examination of the benefits shows that cash 
benefits followed by benefits in kind are those mainly responsible for the redistribution  
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induced. Indirect taxes cause a significant and negative redistributive effect. It is surprising to 
observe that corporate tax, even under the most progressive assumption, does not produce a 
statistically significant redistribution.  
In terms of progressivity, PIT is the most progressive tax and its TR curve statistically 
dominates the TR curves of the other the taxes. Opposite to PIT, indirect taxes present a 
significant regressive nature. Corporate tax variant (2) proves to be more progressive than 
under variant (1). The CT(2) and DT curves cross at the fourth decile. However, a partial TR 





Inference methods on income, tax and benefit distributions are crucial in applied economic 
welfare. It is well-known that the asymptotic distributions of a set of inequality and 
progressivity indices can be derived by using non-degenerate U-statistics theory. As an 
application of this theory, we have described its main guidelines and derived the Suits-
progressivity index distribution. We have also provided a formula for the “plug-in” estimator 
of the variance indices, which are less onerous – in terms of computational cost – than the U-
statistic version (this is specially relevant for those indices whose asymptotic variances 
contain kernels of degree 3).  
As far as inference issues are concerned, there are arguments in favour of using bootstrapping 
as an alternative to the classic approach. By using the statistical matching EPF90-IRPF90 - 
which contains more accurate information on income and taxes than the merely EPF90 
household survey - our results show that bootstrap methods perform better (considering their 
sample precision), particularly those bootstrap methods yielding asymmetric CI).  
Another interesting application of the bootstrap technique is the formulation of multiple 
hypothesis tests for the assessment of Lorenz dominance and other related concepts. We have 
showed that the bootstrap method is a useful technique for Lorenz dominance analysis. 
Moreover, it can be applied even in the case when the independence-between-samples 
assumption does not hold.  
An illustration of such application has been made for the Spanish tax and welfare system. 
According to this analysis, we distinguish clear dominance of cash-benefits on income 
redistribution. Public health and state school education also have significant redistributive 





DERIVATION OF THE SUITS INDEX ASYMPTOTIC DISTRIBUTION 
 
Let X be the pre-tax income variable and Y the tax/benefit variable, 
X G  the pre-tax income 
Gini index and 
Y CR  the relative concentration index corresponding to the tax or benefit Y. 
The Suit index of tax progressivity, Suits (1977), is defined as: 
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= ∫  is the first moment distribution function of X, F is the distribution 
function of variable X, and 
X µ  and 
Y µ  are the population means of X and Y, respectively. 
Given that the covariance term in A.2 can be decomposed as 11 [ ( )] ( ) [ ( )] E YF X E Y E F X − , the 
formula A.1 for the Suits index is reformulated in terms of functionals as: 
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1 η , 
2 η  and 
3 η  are defined in table I. Assume that an i.i.d. random sample is drawn 
from the joint distribution H(x,y), with F(x) and G(y) the respective marginal functions, then 
it follows from Slutsky’s theorem that a consistent estimator,  ˆ S , for the Suits index is 
obtained from the U-statistics associated with the functionals 
1 η , 
2 η  and 
3 η  (see table I): 










Asymptotic normality of S is established by applying Hoeffding’s theorem 7.1 which is about 




Lemma 1. Let H(x,y), F(x) and G(y) be continuous functions with finite second central order 
moments for F and G, that is () EX<∞ , () EY <∞ and ()
2
EX <∞   ()
2
EY <∞ , then the 
random vector [ () X nx µ − ,  () Y ny µ − ,  22 ˆ () n η η − , 
33 ˆ () n η η − , 11 ˆ () n η η − ] follows an asymptotically multivariate normal distribution with 
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X σ , 
2
Y σ ,  XY σ  are the variances of  X and Y and covariance between them respectively. 
The terms  (.) ij υ  represent the covariance between functionals. Next, the application of the 
Delta method leads us to the asymptotic distribution of Suits index: 
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The asymptotic variance of the Suits index is established in the following theorem
9:  
                                                 
9 The quadratic form defined in A.6 is equal to 
12
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12 2 1 2 JJ JJ JJ Σ+Σ− Σ  where j1 and j2 are the sub vectors 
in expression A.7. Note that the two first terms are the asymptotic variances of the relative concentration index, 




Theorem 1. Under the same conditions set for Lemma 1,  ˆ S  is a consistent estimate of S with 
asymptotic normal distribution,  ( )
2 ˆ () 0 ,
S nS S N σ −  →
 , where the variance is defined as  
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A.1 Variance estimator of  ˆ S  based on U-statistics 
 
We illustrate the estimation of the covariance terms  (.) ij υ . Let us consider –as an example- 
the element 
2 (,)
X υµ η . First, we obtain the symmetric kernels that estimate functionals  X µ  
and  2 η .  Given that x  and 
2 ˆ η  (see table I) are the U-statistics of X µ  and  2 η  respectively, the 
corresponding kernels are  11 () hX X =  and 
() () 11 22 1 2 0 1 2 2 1 0 2 1 (( , ),( , )) hXY XY X Y I X X X Y I X X =< +<  with respective degrees  a m =1 
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is consistent estimated as follows:  
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Let us derive now another example, 
23 (, ) υη η , which leads to a kernel of degree three. 
Following the same procedure as the previous steps, the functional is derived as: 
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where the summation is over the set of all permutations of the n sample elements and  (.) h  is 
the kernel defined as: 
()()
() ()
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Other covariance elements of the matrix A.5 can be obtained following the same procedure.   
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A.2 Variance estimator of  ˆ S  based on plug-in estimators 
 
Finally, we have calculated the plug-in estimators corresponding to the elements  (.) ij υ . Let us 
focus again on the two functionals we have explained before. Consider, first, the functional 
2 (,)
X υµ η . A slight re-ordering of the integration variables in A.9 leads to the following 
expression: 
[] 21 2 0 1 2 2 1 0 2 1 2 2 1
11 2 1 211 11 2
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  (A.14)
where  i x  represents the mean income corresponding to individuals of the sample with income 
less than or equal to 
i X ; 
i g  is the mean tax for those individuals in the sample with income 
less than or equal to
i X  and  i p  is the percentage of individuals with income less than or equal 
to 
i X . From expression (A.12) the corresponding plug-in estimator can be obtained. The 
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In the same way, the plug-in estimator corresponding to functional 
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This procedure applies to the elements in matrix A.5. By replacing the elements  (.) ij υ  in the 
index variance formulae with their respective plug-in estimators, we obtain the consistent 
estimate for 
2
S σ  defined in table II. The application of the principle of substitution twice does 
not necessarily imply consistency. Continuity of the functionals appears to ensure consistency 
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Table I. Formulas for indices, functionals and U-statistics.  
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Notes:1.Gini, 2.Kakwani, 3.Suits, 4. Redistributive Effect, 5.Horizontal inequality, 6.Theil(l), , 7.Atkinson.  
The U-statistic that estimates 
() k
X µ  equals the respective sample moment.  
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 TABLE II. ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE ESTIMATES OF INEQUALITY AND TAX PROGRESSIVITY 
INDICES. 
   
Formulae 
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Notes: The asymptotic variance of Cy is also represented by formula 1, after replacing x,η1 and d1 by y, η2 and 
d2, respectively. The asymptotic variance of CRy is derived in appendix A. I(A) represents the indicator function 
with value 1 if A is true, 0 otherwise. Theil and Atkinson variances are not included, they can be derived by 
conventional CLT methods. References for the variance of Gini and Kakwani/redistributive effect indices based 
on U-statistics formulae are Cowell (1989) and Bishop et al. (1998) respectively.  We noted a typographical 







Table III. Parameters of the simulation: real values. 
Indices  Real value 
    Gini   0.38505 
Theil(1)   0.27820 
Lorenz deciles   
  1
st   0.02518 
  3th   0.11112 
  5th   0.24318 
  7th   0.42879 
  9th   0.70349 
Kakwani  
  Direct taxes   0.29947 
  Indirect taxes  -0.14368 
Suits  
  Direct taxes   0.34553 




Table IV. Simulation Analysis: Real approximate coverage for inequality indices, Lorenz ordinates and progessivity measures. 
Index  n = 200  n =1000  n = 2000  n = 200  n =1000  n = 2000 
  Method Standard 
1     BCa  
Gini   0.783  0.795 0.788 0.901 0.929 0.931 











































Kakwani (D)  0.839 0.826 0.841 0.892 0.881 0.901 
Kakwani (I)  0.803 0.837 0.823 0.881 0.926 0.930 
Suits (D)  0.680 0.685 0.716 0.878 0.855 0.855 
Suits (I)  0.826 0.846 0.851 0.864 0.924 0.925 
Notes: Nominal coverage: 0.95. 
1Asymptotic estimate of the standard error 
 
Table V. Simulation Analysis: Real approximate coverage for inequality indices, Lorenz ordinates and progressivity measures. 
Index  n = 200  n =1000  n = 2000  n = 200  n =1000  n = 2000 
  Method Standard 
2     Bootstrap-t  
Gini   0.829 0.879 0.884  0.925   0.952  0.948 











































Kakwani (D)  0.864 0.826 0.855 0.901 0.882 0.925 
Kakwani (I)  0.857 0.897 0.913 0.918 0.935 0.948 
Suits (D)  0.828 0.809 0.832 0.878  0.883 0.899 
Suits (I)  0.848 0.891 0.906 0.906 0.929 0.943 
Notes: Nominal coverage: 0.95. 






Table VI. RE Lorenz dominance : taxes and benefits. 
H0=D(p)=RE(T1)-RE(T2) = 0   H1 = D(p)>0 
Pairwise comparisons  Global-p-values 
BE-DT,   BE-PIT, BE-CT(2),  BE-IT 
DT-PIT,  DT-CT(2),DT-IT 
PIT-CT(2), PIT-IT 
CT(2)-IT 
0.000    0.000,    0.000    0.000 
0.039  
   0.000    0.000 






Table VII. RE Lorenz dominance: benefits.  
H0=D(p)=RE(T1)-RE(T2)=0   H1=D(p)>0  
Pairwise comparisons  Global-p-values 
BE-BEiK, B-HB, BE-NUE, BE-UE  
BEiK-HB, BeiK-NUE, BeiK-UE 
HB-NUE, HB-UE 
NUE-UE 
0.003,   0.000,    0.000,   0.000 
0.001,  
  0.000,    0.000 






Table VIII. TR Lorenz dominance: taxes.  
H0=D(p)=TR(T1)-TR(T2) = 0   H1 = D(p)>0  
Pairwise comparisons  Global-p-values 
PIT-CT(2), PIT-DT, PIT-CT1, PIT-IT
CT(2)-DT, CT(2)-CT(1), CT(2)-IT 
DT-CT(1), DT-IT 
CT(1)-IT 
0.004,   0.003,    0.000,   0.000 
0.550    0.000,   0.000 






Table IX. TR Lorenz dominance: benefits.  
H0=D(p)=TR(T1)-TR(T2) = 0   H1 = D(p)<0  
Pairwise comparisons  Global-p-values 
BE-BEiK, B-HB, BE-NUE, BE-UE  
BEiK-HB, BeiK-NUE, BeiK-UE 
HB-NUE, HB-UE 
NUE-UE 
0.376    1.000     0.800
    0.000 
0.846 
     0.555     0.015 















































































































Table B.1 Simulation Analysis: Interval length and shape(italics) for inequality indices, Lorenz coordinates and progressivity measures 
Index  n = 200  n = 1000  n = 2000  n = 200  n = 1000  n = 2000 
  Method Standard 
1   BCa  
Gini   0.08796 (1.000)  0.04371 (1.000) 0.03178  (1.000) 0.10862  (1.3797) 0.05980  (1.3535) 0.04752  (1.3943) 











































Kakwani (D)  0.09269 (1.000) 0.04968  (1.000) 0.03847  (1.000) 0.10862  (1.0833) 0.05980  (1.0721) 0.04527  (1.0834) 
Kakwani (I) 0.11048  (1.000) 0.05523  (1.000) 0.04057  (1.000) 0.14928  (0.9758) 0.07854  (0.9493) 0.06027  (0.9242) 
Suits (D)  0.12343 (1.000) 0.07678  (1.000) 0.05998  (1.000) 0.18381  (1.1158) 0.10773  (1.1238) 0.08781  (1.1949) 
Suits (I)  0.13922 (1.000) 0.06893  (1.000) 0.04940  (1.000) 0.17252  (1.0770) 0.09032  (0.9781) 0.06766  (0.9406) 
Notes: Nominal coverage: 0.95.  
1Asymptotic estimate of the standard error 
 
 
Table B.2. Simulation Analysis: Interval length and shape(italics) for inequality indices, Lorenz coordinates and progressivity measures 
Index  n = 200  n = 1000  n = 2000  n = 200  n = 1000  n = 2000 
  Method Standard 
2 Bootstrap-t 
Gini   0.09029 (1.000) 0.04864  (1.000) 0.03782  (1.000)  0.14255 (1.6625) 0.06502  (1.4268) 0.04824  (1.3544) 











































Kakwani (D)  0.09291 (1.000) 0.04927  (1.000) 0.03866  (1.000) 0.12809  (1.3513) 0.06935 (1.4074) 0.05443  (1.2305) 
Kakwani (I)  0.12494 (1.000) 0.06516  (1.000) 0.04923  (1.000) 0.19634  (1.0196) 0.08935  (0.9951) 0.06142  (0.9457) 
Suits (D)  0.15775 (1.000) 0.09145  (1.000) 0.07402  (1.000) 0.24876  (1.8209)  0.15921 (1.4793) 0.117696  (1.2621) 
Suits (I)  0.14369 (1.000) 0.07483  (1.000) 0.05543  (1.000) 0.22349  (1.1719) 0.10279  (1.0413) 0.069043  (1.0761) 
Notes: Nominal coverage: 0.95. 
2Bootstrap estimate of the standard error 